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Among  the altematives  for the future  of the Council  for Mutual
Economic  Assistance,  its dissolution  seems  most appropriate  in
view  of differences  in the extent  and speed  of reform  among  its
Eastern  European  members.
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The Council for Mutual!  .onomic Assistance  pwsent arrugemenits, marketizing the CMEA.
(CMEA) was established by Bulgaria, Czecho-  reforming the CMEA. ad dissolvt  de  CMEA.
siovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and  the  In view of differens  in Fe extent mid the speed
Soviet Union in 1948 as a response to the  of the reform efforts in Eastem  European coun-
Marshall Plan.  But unlike the Marshall Plan it  tries, the last altemative appeals  most appropri-
provided no financial assistance to its member  ate.  At the same time, the more developed
countries and its activities were limited to trade  CMEA countries should seek association with
in the framework of bilateral and multilateral  the EC, followed by membership.
negotiations.  Because of centralized
decisionmaking, the lack of price signals, and the  For the transitional period, proposals have
bilateral balancing of trade flows, the CMEA  becn put forward for establishing paymns
countries failed to exploit their trade potential.  arrangements among the former CMEA coun-
And although the smaller CMEA countries  tries.  These proposals have little to commend
benefited from receiving Soviet encrgy and raw  them as they would involve pro-iding  credit on
materials at low prices in exchange for often  the basis of the mutual trade of the countries
poor quality manufactured goods, these gains  concemed rather than their total trade.  And
were more than offset by the losses suffered  while clearing arrangements would bring some
because of insufficient technical change and the  benefit, the countries in question should pursue
straightjacket of the socialist planning system.  the objective of convertibility.
For the future of the CMEA, four alterna-
tives present themselves:  maintaining the
Thc PRE  Working P'apCe  SCrics disseminaies  the  findings  of work under  way in the  Bank's  Policy,  Reseach,  and  Extemal
AffairsComplex.  An  objective  of lhc  scries  is  to  get  these  findings  out  quickly,  cven  if prcsentations  arc  icss  than  fully  polished.
l  The findings,  interpretations,  and  conclusions  in thcsc  papers  do not  necessarily  represent  official Bank  policy.
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assistance.ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN EASTERN EUROPE
Bela Balassa
This paper  will analyze  the  principal features  of  socialist economic
integration in Eastern Europe and examine its future  prospects.  Section I  will
consider the activities of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance  (CMEA).
Section II will examine the issue of subsidization through trade.  Section III
will review the future possibilities for the CMEA, and Section IV will discuss
proposals made for a payments arrangement among CMEA countries.
I.  The Activities of the Council for  Mutual Economic Assistance
The  Communique  announcing  the  establishment  of  the  Council for  Mutual
Economic Assistance was published on  January 25, 1949.  The CMEA  was created in
response to the  Marshall Plan for Western Europe.  However, while the  Marshall
Plaii provided  substantial  financial  assistance  for  the  Western  Euiopean
countries, CMEA involved no transfer of funds.
The  founding.members  of the CMEA were  Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia,
Hungary, Poland, Romania, and the Soviet Union.  Albania joined soon thereafter
and  East  Germany  in  September  1950,  but  Albania  subsequently  ceased  to
participate in CMEA aztivities.  Mongolia, Cuba, and Vietnam joined in later
years but they will not be considered in the following.
Several  meetings  of  the  members of the CMEA took place in 1949 and
1950, but  its activity ceased in mid-1950 and did not revive until mid-1954.
Inst'ad of economic integration, Stalin favored parallel national development,
with the  Soviet  Union  exerting a  directing  influence  through  the  "embassy  system"
under which major economic decisions by the individual countries required the2
agreement of the Soviet embassy.
Followinig  Stalin's death, the CMEA called for the coordination of
five year plans and for production specialization.  In fact, little transpired
in  a multilateral context in  subsequent  years and the  developments that  occurred
took the form of bilateral negotiations.
In  1962, the  CMEA countries negotiated Basic  Principles  of the
International  Socialist  Division of  Labor as the first  major policy statement  on
regional economic cooperation.  However, as Brabant notes "soon thereafter the
document  was disowned by several signatories.  As a result, the CPEs [centrally
planned economies]  failed  to implement the precepts  on regional  production
specialization in the ISDL [international  social  division  of labor]  as laid down
in Basic Principles" (1989,  p. 66).
The failure of implementing Basic Principles had  to do with the
rejection of Khruschev's proposal for a "superplan" on the CMEA level.  While
newspaper reports  concentrated on the  role  of  Romania in  opposing  joint planning,
Hungary and Poland  were opposed also. As Kiss  noted, "the  joint  planning concept
proved to be unrealistic, not only because it was cumbersome technically and
methodologically,  but  also  in  terms of  economic and,  last but  not  least,
political implications" (1975,  p. 747).
For  one  thing, the  centrally  planned  economies "saw,  at best,  limited
salvationi  coming from  transposing  the  problems  of rigid,  physical planning to  the
regional  plane" (Brabant,  1989,  p. 70).  For  another thing,  they  feared increased
Soviet domination if a superplan was to be  instituted.  In this connection,
mention  may be  made of  the fact  that Khruschev's proposal  for a superplan
followed the 1956 events in Hungary and Poland.
In the 1960s,  trade among  the CMEh  countries continued to take  place3
in the framework of bilateral negotiations.  CMEA's influence was little felt
although there  were some specialization  agreements, in  particular in  engineering
products and chemicals.  These agreements  called for specialization in  different
products of a particular industry.
Specialization agreements  were given a  push  by the  Complex Programme
for the  Further Extension and Improvement  of Co-operation  and the Development  of
Socialist  Economic  Integration,  dated  1971.  Under  this  programme,  101
uultilate-al  specialization  agreements  were  signed  between  1972  and  1977;  there
were also  620-700  bilateral  specialization  agreements  (Pecsi,  1981,  p. 13).
Specialization  agreements assumed the  greatest importance in
engineering;  among  120  multilateral  agreements  in  effect  in 1980,  87 concerned
the engineering  industries  (Sobell,  1984, p. 237).  They extended  to ball
bearings,  electrical  equipment,  measuring  instruments,  medical  and  health  care
equipment,  textile  machinery,  agricultural  machinery,  and  machinery  for
construction  and  construction  material. As a result,  apart  from  Poland  and  the
Soviet  Union.  a  substantial  part  of  machinery  trade  occured  in  the  framework  of
specialization agreements.  For  1985, the relevant  percentages were Bulgaria, 58
percent; Czechoslovakia, 44  percent; East Germany,  54 percent;  Hungary,  50
percent;  Poland,  21  percent;  Romania,  62  percent;  and Soviet  Union,  22 percent
(Brabant,  1988,  p. 306).
Another important area for  specialization  agreements  was  the
automotive  industry. An oft  cited  case is Hungary's  specialization  in  buses
produced  by  Ikarus. In  turn,  Hungary  does  not  produce  passenger  automobiles  that
are manufactured in the Soviet  Union, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Poland.
There is also specialization in light, medium, and heavy trucks.  At the same
time, Western firms play an important role, with Fiat-s being produced in the4
Soviet  Union  and Poland,  and  Western  licenses  being  used in the  production  of
trucks  and  buses.
Chemicals  provide  another  area  of specialization.  There  has '-en
some  shift  of  basic  chemicals  to  the  Soviet  Union  where  raw  materials  and  energy
are  available.  The  other  members  of the  CMEA  have  concentrated  on  more  developed
and  fine  chemicals,  with further  specialization  among  products.
Specialization  agreements have  permitted the  exploitation  of
economies  of scale in the framework  of the CMEA.  At the same time, in the
absence of competition,  technological  progress  has not been ensured.  The
technological  backwardness  of  industry  in  the  CMEA  countries  is  observed  across-
the-board,  and  it is  particularly  important  in  modern  branches  of industry  such
as computers  and  electronics.  The  situation  is  aggravated  by the  dominance  of
sellers'  markets in the  CMEA countries,  with the  buyer  accepting  low  quality
merchandise.
Also,  the  extent  of  specialization  should  not  be  overstated.  Faced
with  supply  difficulties  from  their  partners,  CMEA  countries  aimed  at  producing
a  wide range  of products. Thus, it  has  been reported  that  Czechoslovakia  and
East  Germany  manufacture  more  than  70  percent  of the  range  of  machinery  produced
in the  werld (Lavigne,  1990b,  p. 6).
And, specialization  has  been  largely  limited  to final  products;  it
has  not  extended  to  parts  and  components.  Apart  from  the  reluctance  of the  CMEA
countries to rely on  imported  parts and components,  which may  not have
corresponded  to their  specifications  and  often  experienced  delays,  the  pricing
issue  looms  large  in the case  of these  inputs. According  to Lavigne,  "a  non-
resolved  problem  remains;  the  prices  of  parts  and  components.  The  establishment
of world  marlket  prices,  already  difficult  in the case of final  products,  is5
practically  impossible  for parts and componen.  -,  whose characteristics  and
production  conditions  are  highly  variable  ... " (A973,  p. 264).
At the  same  time,  the  CMEA  countries  have  not  exploited  their  market
potential. This  was first  noted  by Pryor  who concluded  that  in the  years  1956
and 1962,  the  volume  of trade  of the  CMEA  countries  was only  50-60  percent  of
that  of comparable  Western  European  countries,  while  such  differences  had not
been  observed  in the  interwar  period.  Pryor's  conclusions  were  reached  in the
framework  of  a  model  incorporating  trade,  per  capita  GNP,  aid  population  figures
(1968,  p. 164).
In the period following  Pryor's  calculations  the CMEA countries
experienced  a  slowdown  in  the  growth  of  their  trade  and  Hewett  confirmed  Pryor's
results  in calculations  made for 1970.  Thus, according  to Hewett, "typical
eastern  trade  is,  ceteris  paribus,  moch  lower  than  typical  western  trade"  (1976,
p. 8).
At the same time,  a decline  occurrec  the share of intra-area
trade. Thus,  the  share  of  intra-CMEA  trade  in  the  total  fell  from  71  percent  in
1959  to  63  percent  in  1971. This  involved  mostly  a  shift  to  trade  with  developed
market  economies  whose  share  in  the  total  increased  from  21  percent  to  27  percent
(Balassa,  1976,  p. 23).
The  share  of  intra-CMEA  trade  declined  further  after  1971.  According
to estimates  by the  United  Nations  Economic  Commission  for  Europe,  in 1989  the
share  of exports  and imports  in trade  among  the  CMEA  countries  in their  total
exports  and  imports  was  Bulgaria,  83  percent  and  /3  percent;  Czechoslovakia,  54
percent  and 55 percent;  East  Germany,  42 percent  and 38 percent;  Hungary,  39
percent  and 39  percent;  Poland,  35  percent  and  32  percent;  Romania,  38  percent
and  53  percent;  and  the  Soviet  Union,  46  percent  and  50  percent.  These  estimates6
are adjusted  further  downwards  if  account  is taken  of the  overvaluation  of the
rouble.
Varic  ~s  factors  account  for  the  lack  of  full  utilization  of  the  trade
potential  of the  CMEA  countries.  To  begin  with,  the  centralization  of economic
decision-making,  reflected in  the planners' desire to  lessen uncertainty
associated  with foreign  trade,  as  well  as the  absence  of  eirect  trade  relations
between firms, tend to limit the volume of trade.
Opportunities for trade may also be foregone because of the lack  of
appropriate price signals.  Domestic  prices in the  CMEA countries do  not reflect
resource scarcities and are divorced from prices in foreign trade.  In turn
foreign trade prices  follow world  market prices with  a  lag and  often show
considerable variations in bilateral relationships (Csaba,  1985, p. 15).  Under
these circumstances, there is a risk that trade in particular commodities may
involve a loss, rather than a gain, for the countries concerned and this risk
tends to discourage trade among them.
At the same time, apart from relationships with the Soviet Union,
there is an attempt to attain trade balance in individual commodity groups, in
particular in "hard goods" and "soft  goods" when the former,  consisting largely
of food, fuels, and raw materials, find ready markets in the developed market
economies that is not the  case for the latter, consistirig  mainly of  manufactured
products.
These  developments  have reinforced  the  practice  of  bilateralism  under
which countries attempt to  avoid  having an export surplus that is  not settled in
convertible currencies.  Thus, the  transferable  ruble is  not transferable  at all
and a surplus earned in trade with one partner cannot be converted into goods
from another.  Bilateralism, in turn, limits the amount or trade.7
Finally,  mention  may  be  made  of  the  propositions  dvanced  by  Holzman.
In  his  view,  the  formation  of the  CMEA  led  to  trade  destruction,  in  part  because
the  CMEA  member  countries  are  poorly  suited  to  trade  with  each  other  and  in  part
because  they  greatly  increased  barriers  a6ainst  nonmember  countries  (1985).
II.  Is the  Soviet  Union  Subsidizing  its  CMEA  Partners  through  Trade?
Traditionally,  it was assumed  that the  Soviet  Union  exploited  the
CMEA  partner  countries  by turning  the  terms  of trade  in  its  favor. According  to
Holzman,  "from  the  formation  of  CMEA  until  at least  the  difficulties  in  1956  in
Hungary  and  Poland,  the  Soviet  Union  exercised  political  power  to  trade  with  the
Eastern  European  nations  at very  favorable  terms  of trade  to itself. In fact,
the  ex-enemy  Eastern  nations  were exploited  ruthlessly  (and  this  includes  the
exploitation  via  deliveries  of reparations)"  (1985,  p. 417).
While  data for  the  pre-1960  period  are  not available,  Marrese  and
Vanous  turned  this  thesis  on its  head  by providing  evidence  that the  terms  of
trade  favor  the  other  CMEA countries  vis-a-vis  the Soviet  Union.  Thus,  they
concluded  that  "within  the  CMEA  the  Soviet  Union  has  been 'subsidizing'  certain
East  European  countries  by  exporting  'hard  goods'  (fuels,  nonfood  raw  materials,
and  to a  lesser  degree  food  ane  caw  materials  for  food)  at CMEA's  ftp's  [foreign
trade prices]  which are below wmp's [world  market  prices],  in exchange  for
imports  of 'soft  goods'  (machinery  and  equipment  and  industrial  consumer  goods)
at CMEA's  ftp's,  which  are  above  wmp's;  subsidization  is  especially  apparent  if
account  is  taken  of the  relatively  low  quality  of East  European  manufactures  in
comparison  with their  Western  counterparts"  (1983,  p. 9).
As the quotation  indicates,  gains and losses  were calculated  by
comparing  prices used in intra-CMEA  trade  with world market  prices,  making
further  adjustments  for  the  quality  of "soft  goods." Price  differences  became8
especially  pronouced  after  1973  when  world  oil  prices  quadrupled  and :he  CMEA
countries  adopted  a five-year  averaging  of world  market  prices  in intra-CMEA
trade. Thus,  in  1970  US  dollars,  the  estimated  average  annual  loss  to  the  Soviet
Union  in  trade  with  its  partner  countries  was  248  million  in  1960-63,  398  million
in 1964-68,  869  million  in 1969-73,  and 28..0  million  in 1974-78  (Marrese  and
Vanous,  1983,  sp.  43-44).
The  Marrese-Vanous  estimates  ware  criticized  on  the  grounds  that  the
authors  used  excessive  qualit;  discounts  to  value  Soviet  imports  and  exports  of
machinery  and equipment  and Soviet  imports  of consumer  goods;  tne discounts
ranged  from  25 percent  to 60 percent  (Marer,  1984).  But these  discounts  are
actually  used in selling  machinery  and  equipment  as well  as consumer  goods  in
Western  markets.
Objections  may  also  be  raised  to  Marer's  argument,  according  to  which
the Soviets  could  not  purchase  CMEA-quality  machinery  in the  West at the  same
discount  at  which  the  East  European's  sell  in  the  West. Apart  from  the  fact  that
CMEA-quality  machinery  is  not  available  in  the  West,  note  that  Western  exporters
offer the Soviet  Union a variety  of advantages  in the form of flexibility,
service,  and  opportunity  for  product  buy  back  that  are  not  available  on  the  part
of CMEA  suppliers.
It  has also  been  suggested  that  relative  scarcities  differ  between
the CMEA and the world market,  leading  to lower relative  prices  of primary
products  in the former  case (Brada,  1985,  p. 89).  However,  the  world  market
prices  offer  the  releva.nt  benchmark  as  they  represent  opportunities  foregone  for
the  CMEA  countries.
At the  same  time,  there  is a source  of subsidization  of the  Soviet
Union  by  the  other  CMEA  countries  that  lies  outside  the  Marrese-Vanous  framework.9
This is the  provision  of capital  for  joint  projects,  such  as the  Odenburg  gas
pipeline.  This subsidization  is due to excessively  sow interest  rates  of 2
percent,  much below Euromarket  rates of 9-10 percent that may provide an
appropriate  benchmark,  given the extensive  use of convertible  currencies  in
extending  credit. In the  absence  of the  necessary  data,  however,  the  extent  of
this  subsidization  cannot  be gauged.
Finally,  questions  arise  about  the  interpretation  of  the  reasons  for
which  the  Soviet  Union  grants  subsidies  to its  partner  countries. According  to
Marrese  and Vinous,  the reason  lies in these  countries  providing  noneconomic
benefits  to the  Soviet  Union  in enhancing  its  security. Thus,  "the  allegiance
of  East  European  countries  can  serve  as  a substitute  for  the  use  of  Soviet  labor
and capital  in providing  security  services  to the Soviet  Union.  Because  tl.
Soviet  Unior.  is  the  dominant  power  within  the  CMEA,  we contend  that  it  utilizes
this  trade-off.  In  other  words,  the  Soviet  Union  engages  in  preferential  traAe
with Eastern  Europe  relative  to the  rest  of the  world  in  order  to  maintain  the
allegiance  of the  East  European  countrries"  (1983,  p. 10).
Marrese  and  Vanous  further  suggest  that  the  ranking  of  countries  by
per  capita  subsidies  also  provides  a ranking  by  noneconomic  benefits  the  Soviet
Union  obtains  through  subsidization.  The  ranking  is  East  Germany,
Czechoslovakia,  Bulgaria,  Hungary,  Poland,  and  Romania.  One  may  argue,  hvwever,
that  this  ranking  is  simply  the  result  of  the  composition  of  trade  between  Soviet
Union  and its partner  countries. Thus,  East  Germany  and Czechoslovakia  rely
largely  on Soviet  fuels  and raw  materials  in  exchange  for  manufactured  goods.
In  turn,  during  the  period  under  consideration,  Romania  purchased  practically  no
Soviet  fuel  and  Poland  could  limit  its  reliance  on  Soviet  fuel  by reason  of its
extensive  coal  deposits.10
At the same time, Marrese and Vanous argue that "domestic labor
unrest in 1970 .'d 1976 (as  well as the national strikes of 1980-81), the large
proportion of the private sector in agriculture, the influence of the Roman
Catholic church, che  population's deep  mistrust  of the  Soviet  Union,  and Poland's
extensive relazions  with the West have combined to create an atmosphere of weak
political allegiance to the Soviet Union  which detracts from Poland's strategic
value" (1983,  p. 71).  Yet, Poland received large financial assistance from the
Soviet Un:on  at  the  time of its  troubles, which much exceeded  the subsidy
calculated by the authors.
Brada further  raises the  question  as to  who provides the  noneconomic
benefits to  the Soviet  Union in  exchange for  subsidization. This will not  be the
population  of  the  Eastern  European  countries  who  object  to  the  loss  of
sovereignty  it  entails.  In turn,  the  ruling  classes in  these  countries share  the
political and strategic interests of the Soviet Union.  In fact, as the events
of the year 1989 indicated, they were kept in place by Soviet power.  Or, as
Brada  expressed it,  "to the  eyes  of  East European  leaders,  many  of the intangible
benefits provide( to the Soviet Union also yield politico-economic benefits to
their own nations and enhance, rather than reduce, the political strength and
stability of their own regimes" (1988,  p. 645).
It  may  be added that  when the  governments  of these  countries  deviated
from  the  path  of  subservience, as  it happened  in Hungary  in  1956 and  in
Czechoslovakia in 1968, the Soviet Union intervened  militarily and changed the
governments.  One  may  wonder, therefore,  if there  was  need for subsidization  when
allegiance could be obtained through military means.
Whatever the  reasons  for  subsidization,  the  question  arises  if it  has
continued beyond the period examined by Marrese and Vanous.  This question has11
been  addressed  in Soviet Union-Hungary  relations by  Marrese  and Wittenberg
(1990).  The  authors  conclude  that  the Soviet  Union  continued  to provide
substantial subsidies  to Hungary  in  1982, but  the  extent  of  subsidization
declined to a considerable extent in 1987.
The relevant figures  are $4.2-4.4  billion and $250-530  million.  The
authors  further note that the fall  in  oil prices  and in  net Soviet  exports of  oil
account for four-fifths of the decrease in the  value of the subsidies.
The estimate for 1987 may be on the low side.  Thus,  according to
Hungarian estimates it  may cost Hungary $1.5 - 2.0 billion to adopt  world  market
pric s in its trade with the Soviet Union from January 1991 onwards (Lavigne,
1990a, p. 13 and Le Monde, January 12, 1990).
Brada (1985) and Koves (1983) raised the question if there may be
other economic losses that offset the gains to CMEA partner countries obtained
from  the -ubsidization  of their  trade  by the  Soviet  Union.  They refer  to  dynamic
losses due to insufficient technological  progress, owing to their obligation to
supply the  Soviet  Union with manufactured  goods.  These dynamic losses, together
with the losses related to  being forced into  the straightjacket  of the  socialist
planned system, will continue for a while whereas the gains from subsidization
through trade  will disappear in 1991.
III.  The Future of the CMEA
The  next  question  concerns  the  future  of  the  CMEA.  Several
possibilities present themselves.  They include the maintenance of the present
arrangement; marketization within the  GMEA; CMEA reform; and the dissolution of
the CMEA.  These will be considered in turn.
Maintaining  the  present system of  the  CMEA  does not  present  a
desirable option.  With the member countries reforming their economies, basing12
intra-CMEA trade on quota-type  bilateral agreements represents a conflict since
market elements would coexist with elements of planning.
This conflict  has been  apparent  already following the 1968  Hungarian
reforms.  While Hungary eliminated plan indicators, allowing firms to establish
market relations,  exports to  the  CMEA  countries  had to  be regulated  by government
orders. Also,  problems  have  arisen  in  pricing,  with  domestic  prices  differing
from the prices used in intra-CMEA trade (Antaloczy, 1989).
These problems  would be accentuated  with the extension  of reforms in
Hungary and  economic reforms undertaken  by other CMEA  countries.  In  particular,
the  transformation  of  socialist  firms  into  profit-making  units  and  their  eventual
privatization  is  incompatible  with  the  maintenance  of  the  present  CMEA
arrangements.
Marketization  within the CMEA  was envisaged at the  44th CMEA Council
Session held in Prague in July 6, 1988.  In this connection one may quote the
statement by George Atanasov, Chairman of the Council of Ministers:
"We believe that the efforts to overhaul the integration  mechanism and to
construct a qualitatively new model of intra-community cooperation would
be  centered  on  the  creation  of  a  single  market  of  the  CMEA  member
countries, complete with a free movement of goods, services and other
factors of production.  The need of such a market stems objectively from
the  logic of economic  reforms in  the individual  socialist  countries,  which
are  centered  on  the promotion  of  commodity-money  [market] relations"
(cited in Schrenk, 1990, p. 1).
Marketization  within  the  CMEA  would  establish  an  EC-type  integration.
But  this presupposes  that all  CMEA member countries undertake  far-reaching
economic reforms, involving transformation into market economies.  This is not
in the cards.
While  Poland shocked  its economy with  its January  1990 reform,
despite  its  earlier  reforms  Hungary  is  proceeding  at  a  slower  pace  and13
Czechoslovakia  envisages a slow transformation  of its  centrally  planned  economy.
Also, Bulgaria  has gone  no further  than  declaring its intention  to reform  and the
situation in Romania remains unsettled.
Finally, the Soviet Union has made little progress in perestroika
after five years.  While in early 1990 indications were that a major reform
effort was in  the offing, the announcement  made in  May 1990 concerned  only price
increases.  These increases were subsequently withdrawn and it is questionable
how far the reforms under preparation will go.
If neither the maintenance of present arrangements within the CMEA
nor its  marketization  present a  desirable  or  feasible  option,  the  question  arises
if the CMEA could survive through a reform.  This is the alternative envisaged
by Lavigne  who  argues  that  it fits  in with  the  regionalization proceeding
elsewhere in the  world.  At the same time, Lavigne expressed the  view that "the
countries of Eastern Europe deceive themselves if they expect eventually to be
integrated with Western Europe" (1980a.  p. 9).
This  statement  relegates  the  Eastern  European  countries  to  an
economic backwater.  Rather  than  integrating with  Soviet Union,  where  the
prospects for reform are at best murky, the Eastern European countries want to
become developed market economies.  In so doing, integration into the EC offers
an important avenue.
Nor can it  be assumed that the EC would reject countries that carry
out far-reaching reforms in  decentralizing and privatizing their economies.  In
fact, the EC is prepared to eventually accept European market economies as new
members if they agree to adopt its rules and regulations.  In this connection,
reference may be  made  to Greece and Portugal  that were  not more  developed
economically than  the Eastern  European  countries  at the  time  of their  application14
for membership.
Another argument against the dissolution of the CMEA has been put
forward by Schrenk.  According to him, "a demise of the CMEA in consequence of
a joint decision of all its members can be ruled out as implausible" (1990,  p.
23), because it would conflict with the geopolitical objective of the Soviet
Union.  But if all other member countries were to demand the dissolution of the
CMEA, could the Soviet Union resist?
Schrenk,  however, rules  out the  exit  of individual  countries.  In  his
view, "as this would violate the geopolitical objective of the USSR, it would
amount to an 'adversary  separation,' and is likely to provoke hostile responses
from the USSR.  Volume and composition of CMEA trade ...  suggest the likely
direction  of the eminently  credible threat  of economic  retaliation:  curtailment
of trade with the exiting country to the point of trade embargo" (Ibid).
But one member country, East Germany, is actually exiting from the
CMEA without invoking Soviet retaliation.  Rather, the Soviets wish to ensure
that East Germany will continue to provide the products it had so far supplied
to the Soviet Union.
Yet, East Germany is the second largest economy in CMEA and its
departure will leave a hiatus in CMEA.  Now, if Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and
Poland also exited, in practical terms CMEA would cease to exist.
At the same time, the maintenance of preferential ties with their
CMEA partners is  not  compatible with these  countries  wishing to  become developed
market economies.  In  fact, their interest  lies in  ha-ing preferential ties  with
the EC that combines the majority of European developed countries.
Thus, Czechoslovakia,  Hungary, and Poland would favor the  demise of
CMEA and the establishment of preferential ties with the EC.  Initially, this15
would involve  unilateral preferences  granted  by the  EC  but full membership could
be envisaged in a decade or so.
In  awaiting  membership in  the EC,  should the  three  countries  envisage
participation in EFTA?  This is not recommended since EFTA membership is not a
stepping-stone  to EC  membership.  Also, several  of the  EFTA countries themselves
wish to become EC members.
Should,  then,  Czechoslovakia,  Hungary,  and  Poland  envisage
establishing a free trade area or a customs union on their own?  This may be
desirable once these countries have gone far enough in their reform process.
Establishing a free trade area or customs union among themselves  would in fact
help the process of structural transformation in their economies by increasing
competition.
The discussion so  far  has not concerned Bulgaria  and Romania.  These
countries  are at a  lower level of development and are  far behind  in their
economic reform.  They thus  provide little  attraction to  the EC  and cannot  aspire
to participate in a Hungarian-Czech-Polish free trade area or customs union.
Finally,  the Soviet  Union is  a sui generis  case.  In the  foreseeable
future,  it  will  be preoccupied  with its  own  economic  reforms  and  with  maintaining
its political and economic unity.  The statement made by the President of the
Republic  of  Russia in  June 1990  to  drastically  reduce  contributions to  the  budg:t
of the  Soviet  Union and the  declarations  of several  republics  as to  the supremacy
of their laws are indicative  of tendencies towards  disintegration in the Soviet
Union.
But  how  about  the  modalities  of  trade  among  the  former  CMEA
countries?  This  presupposes  bilateral  agreements  among  the  countries  in
question.  Such  agreements  should  call  for  trade  relationships  between16
enterprises instead  of  between states  and the use of current  world market prices
instead  of five-year  averages in  the conduct of such trade.  The introduction  of
such prices would help the reform process by aligning domestic prices to those
obtainable in the world market.
IV.  Payments Arrangements Among CMEA Countries
Under present conditions, the  CMEA  countries  carry their  accounts on
bilateral  trade in so-called  transferable  rubles. As noted above,  this is  a
misnomer, since  the  rubles cannot  be used to  purchase goods from  third  countries.
Rather,  an export  surplus  gives  rise  to  a credit  that  remains  frozen.
With the dissolution of the CMEA, trade balances should be paid in
convertible  currencies.  Given the  scarcity  of convertible  currencies in  Eastern
Europe, proposals have been made for payments arrangements.  One such proposal
has been put forward by Ethier (1990).
Ethier  suggests  a  monthly  clearing  of  balances  among  Eastern  European
countries participating in a payments union, with mutual credit provided up to
a certain limit.  The clearing would also cover balances with nonparticipating
Eastern European countries, assumed to include the Soviet Union.
This  proposal draws on the  experience  of the European  Payments  Union
that  also  involved  a  clearing  of  balances  and  provided  credit  up  to  a
predetermined limit.  But while in the EPU a third party, the United States,
supplied  the credits,  the  Ethier proposal  envisages mutual  credits by  the
participants.  This provides no incentive for a creditor country to participate
in the payments  unions since it  would use scarce foreign  exchange to  finance the
deficit of the partner countries in their mutual trade.
The conclusion is strengthened if  we consider that under the Ethier
proposal,  credit  would  also  be  provided  for  imbalances  in  trade  with17
nonparticipating Eastern European countries.  Thus, if country A had a deficit
and country B a surplus in trade  with the Soviet  Union, country B would provide
a credit.
Apart  from the treatment of trade balances with nonparticipating
Eastern European countries, the main problem with payments arrangements that
involve the granting of mutual credits is that they are based on one segment  of
the balance of payments rather than on the overall balance.  It is for this
reason that the idea of a payments union was abandoned by ESCAP.  Also, the
payments  arrangement  in  the  Central American  Common  Market  broke  down  as
Nicaragua ran large deficits in intra-group trade that were financed by Costa
Rica and  Guatemala, although these  countries were in  an overall deficit  position
(Michalopoulos, 1990, p. 10).
A  possible  argument  in  favor  of  a  payments  union  is  that  it
contributes to the expansion of trade.  This occurred in the EPU as countries
dismantled their quantitative import restrictions.  But such restrictions were
dismantled  vis-a-vis nonparticipating  countries as  well so that trade  with these
countries expanded also.
The Eastern European countries would also need to liberalize trade
across the board.  Such trade liberalization  however does not require payments
arrangements among particular countries th t would focus on their mutual trade
rather than on their overall trade.
It may be suggested that, in order to avoid the problems resulting
from large and persistent debtor and creditor  positions and the  need to finance
intraregional,  as  opposed  to  global  deficits,  payments  arrangements  be
established starting out from initial trade positions.  But in Eastern Europe,18
it  is  precisely  the  initial  trade  positions  of  the  cou  t  ies  concerned  that  need
to  be changed  since  the  price  relations  on which  they  are  based  are  distorted
(Ibid,  pp.  11-12).
But  how about  the  outside  financing  of credits  in  a payments  union
of Easte:n European  countries?  Such an alternative  has been put forward,
entailing  the  creation  of a fund  of convertible  currencies  from  which  Eastern
European  countries  could  borrow  to  settle  trade  debts  with  each  other  (New  York
Times,  May  9, 1990).
Outside  aid  eases  the  problem  of financing  debtor  positions  within
a  payments  union  and  removes  the  disincentive  of  creditors  to  participate  in  the
union. But  the  benefit  of the  financial  aid  would  accrue  exclusively  to  debtor
countries  within  the  payments  union  as it  would  be  based  on  balance-of-payments
positions  in  mutual  trade  rather  than  the  overall  balance-of-payments  position.
Yet, it  is  the  latter  rather  than  the  former  that  provides  a  rational  basis  for
the  granting  of outside  credits.
These  considerations  indicate  that  the  establishment  of a payments
union  among  Eastern  European  countries  would  not  be desirable,  irrespective  of
whether  outstanding  balances  would  be  financed  mutually  or  from  the  outside.  One
may envisage, however,  clearing  arrangements  under which mutual credit is
provided  for  a  short  period  (say  three  months),  with  repayment  at  the  end  of  the
period.
A  clearing  arrangement  would  provide  some  savings  in  foreign  exchange
as countries  could  hold  smaller  reserves  than  would  otherwise  be the  case. But
the  extent  of  savings  through  such  an  arrangement  sibould  not  be overestimated  as
trade  among  the  Eastern  European  countries  (excluding  the  Soviet  Union)  amounts19
to only 15-30  percent of their total trade.  At the same time,  at the end of the
three-months period, payment would need to be made in convertible currencies.
While a  clearing arrangement  provides  some  benefit to  countries  with
inconvertible currencies, the goal should be to establish convertibility.  This
will take  some time,  given the difficult  economic situation in  which the  Eastern
European countries find themselves,  but they should take measures to pursue the
objective of currency convertibility.
V. Conclusions
This paper has reviewed the activities of the Council for Mutual
Economic Assistance  since  its establishment in  1949.  While  specialization
agreements  have permitted exploiting economies of scale, technological  progress
has  been  slow.  Also,  the CMEA  countries have  not  exploited  their market
potential, due  to the centralization of  decision-making, the lack of price
signals, and  ilateral  balancing.
The paper has further considered the issue of subsidization of the
partner countries through trade  by the Soviet  Union.  The evidence supports the
existence of subsidization that will come to an end, however, as world market
prices will be used in intra-CMEA  trade.  At the same time, the  Eastern European
countries  have suffered  dynamic losses  in the  form  of insufficient  technological
progress  in  their  trade with  the  Soviet Union  and  being  forced  into  the
straightjacket of the socialist planning system.
As to  the  future  of  the  CMEA,  four  alternatives  have been  considered:
the  maintenance of the  present arrangement,  marketization within the CMEA,  CMEA
reform, and the  dissolution of the CMEA.  The paper favors the last alternative
and  suggests that  the  more  developed  CMEA  countries seek  association  with the  EC,20
fo lo.wed  1,';  membership.
The paper also  objects to  payments arrangement  among the former  CMEA
countries that  would involve  providing credit  on the  basis of their  mutual trade
rather than  total trade.  And while  clearing arrangements would bring  some
betnefits,  the  countries in  question should take  measures to  pursue the  objective
of convertibility.21
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